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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1287 
 ___________ 
 
 RICHARD BALTER, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 RICARDO MARTINEZ 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1:10-cv-03659) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible   
 Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 29, 2012 
 Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 30, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 The appellant, Richard Balter, is a federal prisoner currently housed at FCI 
Beaumont in Beaumont, Texas.  He is serving a life sentence in connection with the 
murder for hire of Richard Cohen.  The sentencing court also imposed a fine of $175,000 
and ordered restitution in the amount of $112,511.  In 1996, we affirmed his conviction 
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and sentence.  See generally United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1011 (1996).
1
    
 In late 2009, while housed at USP Allenwood, Balter filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
2
  He claimed that the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) had imposed ―sanctions‖ against him for his failure to acquiesce to the Inmate 
Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP).  Balter argued that this was a violation of the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which had established that the sentencing 
court was to be the source of ―set[ting] schedule[s] of restitution payments‖ and that 
authority ―cannot be delegated . . . to BOP.‖  Balter sought ―removal of all BOP imposed 
fee or [I]FRP collections against him‖ and cessation of sanctions.  Nowhere in his 
petition, or in his other supporting documents in the District Court, did Balter explain the 
nature of the alleged ―sanctions‖ in question. 
 We need not recount the balance of proceedings below.  At some point, however, 
Balter’s rationale shifted; he was not challenging the BOP’s actions, he explained, but 
rather the District Court’s error in ―appoint[ing] the [BOP] as [its] collection agency.‖  
See Traverse 1, ECF No. 20.  He claimed that this framing of his challenge relieved him 
                                                 
1
 Balter has pursued additional challenges to aspects of his conviction and sentence.  See 
Balter v. United States, 410 F. App’x 428 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam, unpublished); 
United States v. Balter, 164 F. App’x 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam, unpublished) 
(affirming the denial of a motion for remission of restitution); see also C.A. No. 98-5440 
(order entered Sept. 29, 2009) (denying certificate of appealability from motion to 
vacate).  
 
2
 M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 3:09-cv-00504. 
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of the need to exhaust administrative remedies before filing his petition, as any attempt to 
do so would be futile. 
 Following a transfer to the District of New Jersey, the petition was denied by the 
District Court.  See generally Balter v. Martinez, No. 10–3659, 2012 WL 82216 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 10, 2012).  This appeal followed.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, exercising ―plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
apply[ing] a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.‖  O’Donald v. Johns, 402 
F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).  We may affirm on any ground supported 
by the record.  Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
 Under either theory of the case advanced by Balter, this habeas corpus petition 
fails and, as a result, was properly denied by the District Court.  Assuming that he is 
attacking the IFRP, we note that he has never identified the ―sanctions‖ to which he was 
allegedly subjected.  However, his arguments on appeal suggest that he is complaining of 
the ―withholding [of] benefits‖ that ―satisfactory participation‖ in the IFRP would 
otherwise confer.  Supp. to Appellant’s Br. 2.  These arguments are forestalled by case 
law that has repeatedly found the IFRP to be voluntary and lawful.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Boyd, 608 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2010); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 
(3d Cir. 1989).  Balter ―ha[s] no entitlement, constitutional or otherwise, to any of the 
benefits agreeing to participate in the IFRP would provide, such as a work detail outside 
the prison perimeter, a higher commissary spending limit, a release gratuity, or pay 
4 
 
beyond the maintenance pay level.‖  United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 Moving to Balter’s alternative rationale—that he is attacking the District Court’s 
failure to set a restitution schedule—his petition fails primarily because the proper time 
for challenging a restitution order is on direct appeal, and a § 2241 petition ―cannot be 
used to challenge just the restitution part of a sentence when the custody supporting . . . 
jurisdiction is actual imprisonment.‖  Arnaiz v. Warden, 594 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2007) (―Restitution 
orders that sweep too much conduct into their calculations are issues that must be raised 
on direct appeal . . . .‖).  The time for attacking the actual restitution order has long since 
passed.
3
 
 In sum, because this appeal fails to present a substantial question, we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6. 
                                                 
3
 Even if Balter were able to attack the restitution order, he would not be able to do so 
under the MVRA or our intervening case law on the subject.  The MVRA was enacted on 
April 24, 1996, and it applies only to ―sentencing proceedings in cases in which the 
defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment.‖  United States v. Comer, 93 
F.3d 1271, 1274 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also United States v. 
Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1998).  But see United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 
(2d Cir. 1994) (discussing improper delegation under the predecessor statute to the 
MVRA).  Similarly, Balter cannot, in general, take advantage of new law arising after his 
conviction became final in 1996.  See Reinhold v. Rozum, 604 F.3d 149, 153–54  (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
